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a b s t r a c t
Study region: Kuchlagh, Balochistan Province, Pakistan.
Study focus: The depletion of groundwater is a specter presented for many parts
of theworld that rely on theunmanageduse of groundwater. This article describes
how the alluvial aquifer in Kuchlagh was exhausted after three decades of inten-
sive use frommore than three hundred agriculturalwells andhow thewater users
gradually adapted to it. Intense and unsustainable resource use is often expected
to lead to conﬂict or cooperation. However, in Kuchlagh overuse did not lead to
conﬂict nor did it trigger a process of cooperation or the use of efﬁcient irrigation
methods or the adaptation of local groundwater rechargemeasures. The situation
is best described as a ‘socio-institutional void’ in which at no point in time action
is taken, whereas at the same time the resource is gradually destroyed.
New hydrological insights for the region: In Kuchlagh the loss of opportunities
in high value horticulture were cushioned by emerging urban employment, by
developing agriculture in other parts of the Province or by simply ‘chasing the
water table deeper’, i.e. investment in pumping from the hard rock layers under-
neath the alluvial aquifer. This suggests that if groundwater depletion occurs in
a single isolated place it may not necessarily lead to human disaster or trigger a
turn-around as the loss of resources may be compensated by other intervening
opportunities.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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1. Introduction
Groundwater irrigation has been a major force behind the spectacular increase in food production
in South Asia. The reliability and timeliness of groundwater use and the additional water it brought
hasmade it an integral part of the region’s green revolution since the 1970s. However, groundwater is
also the world’s ‘most mined resource’ (UNESCO, 2003; Mukherjee et al., 2015). Over recent decades,
groundwater use has grown exponentially in scale and intensity in many places, leading to aquifer
depletion and groundwater pollution (Giordano, 2009; Wada et al., 2010; Kulkarni et al., 2015). The
NationalAcademyof Sciences (2012) for instance in its report onglaciermelt in theHimalayanasserted
that groundwater over use was a bigger problem in the Indo Gangetic Basin than the melt associated
with climate change and air pollution. In Pakistan, the decrease in water tables outside the canal areas
is a threat to the sustainability of irrigated agriculture.
This article describes the steady decline in groundwater levels over a period of thirty years in
Kuchlagh sub-basin in Pishin Lora Basin in Pakistan’s arid western Province of Balochistan. It is based
on a longitudinal study with research visits to the area in 1993, 1998, 2005 and 2011. Initially in
1970s the groundwater use was very nominal through karezes and open dug wells. Groundwater use
however increased steeply around 1980 with economic expansion and in particular the development
of transport to largemarkets like Lahore andKarachi and the inﬂux of Afghan refugees, bringing skilled
labor. By the latenineties andearly part of 2000s apointwas reachedwhereby themain alluvial aquifer
in Kuchlagh was exhausted.
Kuchlaghpresents a specterpredicted formore semi-arid areasof theworld thatdependonunman-
aged groundwater, particularly where there is little recharge to compensate for the intensive use
of groundwater. This article traces how groundwater users responded to the falling and later dis-
appearing water tables and how livelihoods were adjusted over time as the groundwater reserves
vanished.
Several theories link more intense resource use and competition over resources to either one of
the two opposite outcomes: either there will be more conﬂict or there will be more cooperation.
The main exponent of this ﬁrst ‘pessimist’ cluster of theories is the Neo-Malthusian school. Resource
scarcity is caused by an increase in demand whereas at the same time resources are in limited sup-
ply, and this may even exacerbated by unequal access. The resulting tension weakens institutions.
This encourages resource capture and encroachment, which further undermines the resource bases.
Instability increases. Another main cluster of resource scarcity theories is ‘optimist’ in outlook and
predicts that resource competition will lead to cooperation. If resource scarcity does occur, techno-
logical innovation, efﬁciency, conservation or other forms of human ingenuity and cooperation are
triggered. Boserup is the main inspiration for this school of thought. There is the assumption that
humans can respond to scarcity by a variety of mechanisms: regulation, market mechanisms and
pricing, technological innovation or more intense development investment.
A third theoretical perspective emerged more recently, particularly in the work in transboundary
water management by Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2010). In their so-called TWINS perspective Zeitoun
and Mirumachi demonstrate that conﬂict and cooperation can very well co-exist. Conﬂict is not nec-
essarily problematic: it helps to raise the issue and come to a redeﬁned and better system of resource
management. Also cooperation is not necessarily good, as it can for instance consolidate relations that
are asymmetrical and unbalanced. The drivers of cooperation and conﬂict are not exclusively related
to scarcity and competition, but also include power hegemonies, governance arrangements and the
dominant political discourses.
This article discusses an example from arid high land South Asia where groundwater depletion
ran its full course and scarcity rapidly turned into exhaustion. The ﬁrst part of this article (Section 2)
describes the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ in Kuchlagh: the accelerated use of groundwater till the
point was reached whereby ﬁrst water tables started to severely drop. The next section (Section 3)
discusses the tipping point that was reached in 1998–2004, when the alluvial aquifer was by and large
exhausted. Section 4 describes the coping mechanisms of different groups of water users after 2004,
the institutional responses in terms of conﬂict and cooperation and economic options. Section 5 is a
summary of ﬁndings and Section 6 discusses what the Kuchlagh case suggests for theories on conﬂict
and cooperation over over-used resources.
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Fig. 1. Land use in sub-basins of Pishin Lora Basin.
Source: Halcrow Pakistan and Cameos (2008a).
2. Race to the bottom in Kuchlagh: 1980–1998
Kuchlagh is situated in the Pishin Lora Basin, just northeast of the center of the basin. The Kuchlagh
sub basin is a part of the intermountain valley system of Balochistan formed due to the ingression of
Indian Shield under the Arabian Shield. This has resulted in over-folding of rockswith a series of thrust
faults trending northeast–southwest, giving rise to a complicated hydrogeology. The sedimentary
rocks of the basin range in age from Jurassic to Recent. Over time the synclinal zones were ﬁlled with
alluvialmaterial –oftendeposits of gravels andboulders in the formof fanglomerates andpoorly sorted
sand and clay sediments. These alluvial deposits constitute the most important aquifers in the area
(Halcrow Pakistan and Cameos, 2008a). The Kuchlagh sub basin measures 2083 square kilometers.
Of this area 340 square kilometers is cultivable. Rainfall measures 217mm/annually, with a large
variability. Annual evaporation is in the order of 1750mm: the area is classiﬁed as arid (Fig. 1).
Agriculture sector uses 97% of the water in Balochistan (Khair et al., 2010) and Kuchlagh is no
exception to this. In the entire Pishin district in which Kuchlagh is situated farming still provides
the livelihood to 31–49% of the rural population (Halcrow Pakistan and Cameos, 2008a). There were
no landless families in Kuchlagh until the early eighties, but there was a difference in access to
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groundwater from the alluvial aquifer – depending on the share one had in the collective water sys-
tems. In Kuchlagh there were originally no people without land, but there were ‘waterless’ families,
who instead depended on run-off farming only.
The original residents of Kuchlagh were Sargarha, Dumer and Essa Khel. These are sub clans of
the Kakar and Kasi tribes of the Pashtun ethnic group. Though rules can be very strong and lineage
solidarity is paramount, Pashtun tribes do not have a centralized authority. This clearly sets them
apart from other ethnic groups in Balochistan Province (Van Steenbergen, 1996). At the census of
1977 the population of Kuchlagh town was 7000 persons. At this time most of the farm land was
under cultivation. Annual crops were common: wheat, vegetables and potatoes. Fruit Trees – apples,
mulberries and apricots – were cultivated as well but sporadically at this time. The main sources
both of irrigation and domestic water were karezes and springs. Karezes are the marvel of traditional
engineeringwitha “motherwell” at thebaseof thehills andanumberof otherwells connected through
tunnels – with an outlet near the valley ﬂoor with culturable lands. These vertical well systems are
known as qanats in Iran and aﬂaj in Oman. Water rights in the Kuchlagh karezes were deﬁned by time
shares. These did not necessarily correspond to land holding, but more to the original investment in
the development of the kareze and the subsequent exchange and trade of water shares.
From the 1970s onwards two developments took place that altered the local economy. The ﬁrst
change was the accelerated population growth, caused by the inﬂux of Afghan refugees. This started
in 1982 at the time of the USSR-Afghan war. Over the years the population in Kuchlagh grew very fast
– with a secondwave of displaced persons arriving after the Allied Forces operations in Afghanistan in
2001. The population of Kuchlagh eventually reached an estimated 120,000 in 2011. The small cross
roads town was transformed into a satellite city of the provincial capital, Quetta, thirty kilometers
away.
The second change was the emergence of the lucrative apple cultivation. This caused a steep
increase in the use of groundwater. In the ﬁrst stage – in the seventies – dug wells were developed
often by ‘have not’ farmers – i.e. those without a share in the jointly owned kareze or spring. In due
timewater tables dropped andwent beyond the level where karezes and springs could be relied upon.
This set in motion a classical groundwater ‘race to the bottom’. The faltering karezes accelerated the
development of more dug wells in the late seventies and eighties by those who could afford it. Ulti-
mately, these dug wells fell victim to the overexploitation of ground water as well. Spring boxes were
installed inside the dugwells. However aswater tables continued to fall, these failed too and dugwells
were replaced from the early eighties onwards by electric powered deep tubewells, using submersible
pumps (Van Steenbergen, 1995; Mustafa and Usman Qazi, 2007; Baloch and Tanik, 2008). By 1990 the
ground water level was 80m below the surface. It kept declining and tubewells were drilled ever
deeper. Agriculture by that time had transformed – and the Kuchlagh area was dominated by high
value commercial horticulture. The high returns from the apple cultivation were fuelling investment
in more and deeper tubewells. By this time almost every farmer in Kuchlagh had established a fruit
orchard, though not all farmers (5–25%) had a tubewell of their own. They, however, had access to
groundwater through ‘water tenancies’, whereby a tubewell owner provides irrigation services and
in return receives one-fourth of the crop. On average a tubewell served 6–8ha of land. Orchards were
mainly cultivated through specializedhired labor, oftenmigrants fromAfghanistan. Small landowners
relied less on hired labor, using family labor instead.
Change came in the mid nineties. First apple cultivation lost its luster. Production had increased
so much throughout Balochistan that a glut was created. In Kuchlagh at this time also some of the
older apple orchards were beyond their prime productivity – at an age of ﬁfteen years. The worsened
electricity supply further dampened orchard expansion. It also paradoxically encouraged additional
tubewell development by those farmers that could afford it. The idea of the additional drilling was
that several wells would operate at the same time, when there was no power outage. Farmers in the
area were particularly concerned about adequate irrigation water supply in the last stages of fruit
development, which determines the quality of the apple.
The major change manifested itself in 1998 when new tubewells for the ﬁrst time started to hit
the bottom of the alluvial aquifer – at approximately 120m depth. The decline in water table con-
tinued with several tubewells going dry or having severely reduced discharge. In several cases a
network of pipelineswas developed to conveywater from the remaining functioning tubewells.What
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Table 1
Tubewells in Kuchlagh sub drainage basin.
Type No. of TWs Remarks
Domestic water supply 15 Operated by Public Health Engineering Department
Agriculture – illegal connection 20 No payment of electricity charge
Agriculture – legal connection 244 Payment of ﬂat rate of PAR 4000/month (USD 45)
Total 279
is remarkable is that even though the writing was clearly on the wall, no initiative was taken either
by farmers or others to reverse the trend – through local regulation or the imposition of more water-
efﬁcient farming for instance. Rather the opposite – farmers continued irrigating even winter wheat,
whereas the same crop was very cheaply available in the market. No water saving measures were
introduced – whereas pilots had shown that higher apple yields would come with less water (the
reason being less loss of blossom and better fruit setting).
With tubewells reaching the bottom of the alluvial aquifer, the race to the bottom had reached its
logical conclusion. In the period up to this a shake-out had already taken place – small farmers could
not stay in the race to the bottom. Only the rich farmers were left on the ground to go for the deep
tube wells, but these were eventually falling dry too.
3. Turning point 1998–2004
A new era started in the late 1990s with a substantial decline in the agricultural economy. From
1999 onwards some of the remaining farmers invested more in even deeper tube wells beyond the
alluvial aquifer – penetrating the harder limestone formation. These wells were typically drilled at a
depth of 250mThe yield of these new deep tubewells was far less – notmore than 15% of a production
well in the alluvial aquifer in the good years. Other farmers continued to run their well in the alluvial
aquifer but again with increasingly marginal results.
Irrigated agriculture reduced to20%ofwhat itwas in theheydays of the early eighties. The extended
drought around 2003–2004 accelerated the transformation. At this time apple treeswere cut down on
amassive scale. Farmingwasnot abandonedbut appleswere substituted for lesswater demanding and
lesswater sensitive crops – apricot, grapes and vegetables. The cultivation ofwinterwheat – irrational
from a water economics point of view – continued. Tubewell owners with a legal connection paid a
ﬂat rate of as little as PAR 4000 per month (USD 45 per month),1 so there was no ﬁnancial incentive
not to pump for winter wheat.
The balance sheet is that 400 tubewells connections2 were issued from1977 to 2011 to the farmers
in the area (sub tehsil Kuchlagh and some adjoining portion of Quetta tehsil). Currently, only 259
‘ofﬁcial’ tubewells are somehow functional in the area – see Table 1 – but at signiﬁcantly reduced
discharges. In addition there are 20 tubewells that have an illegal connection to the power grid. Table 1
shows the use of tube wells.3
Most pumping is for agriculture, asmentioned for apricot, grapes and vegetables andwinterwheat.
Water sharingbetween farmers is still practiced. It is notbasedonpayments, but on informal reciprocal
exchange.
In addition use of the shallow aquifer continues in a limited decree, mainly fed by seepage water
from surface sources and leakage from pumping. As mentioned, the population of Kuchlagh increased
1 In this period there was a high level debate on the subsidized ﬂat rates for agricultural water use. As part of a loan of the
Asian Development Bank the rationalization of tubewell subsidies was agreed by the Government of Balochistan. To affect the
ﬁrst release of the loan the Chief Minister of Balochistan announced the closure of illegal connections and the changes in the
electricity tariffs. After this opening gambit the policy stalled. A major opponent was WAPDA – the power company. WAPDA
management and employees stand to beneﬁt substantially from the ﬂat rates as it makes it possible to cover electricity losses
under the ﬂat rates consumption.
2 All tubewells are powered by electricity. The main ‘regulation’ in fact is not the license for to operate a well under the 1978
Groundwater Rights Administration Ordinance but the sanctioning of a power connection for the tubewell.
3 These tube wells are powered by Sheikh Manda Grid Station and the newly built grid station at Kuchlagh.
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tremendously– rising tomore than twenty times thepopulationof1977. Thereareanestimated27,000
households and approximately one-third of these – mainly in the south of the city – have excavated a
small diameter tubewell or open dugwells in their compounds for domestic use. The water is used for
washing clothes and for home gardening – not for drinking water as it brackish. Small quantities are
tapped at 20–30m depth – lifted with buckets or small donkey pumps. The source of this recharged
shallow groundwaterwater is the excesswater of surrounding irrigated farms and the run-off trapped
in artiﬁcial ditches that are excavated for selling of soil used for house construction. In addition, some
water replenished from recharge ponds (so called ‘delay action dams’) after rainfall.
4. Adapt or manage: 2004–2011
Farmers and agricultural laborers responded to the collapse of the alluvial aquifer in several ways.
Though no steps were taken to undertake groundwater management, by and large a livelihood crisis
was avoided. Neither did conﬂicts occur between obviously competing resource users nor did new
forms of cooperation emerge that would have regulated the use of groundwater.
Instead farmers ‘dealt’ with the situation and adopted a number of coping mechanisms: either
(1) selling out and seeking non agricultural livelihoods (2) developing new farms elsewhere or (3)
continue farming in Kuchlagh but tapping water from greater depth but under a changed cropping
pattern.
The earnings from several decades of commercial farming and the parallel urbanization of Kuch-
lagh meant there were sufﬁcient opportunities in the local economy to cushion the blow from the
diminished agriculture that came with the depletion of the alluvial aquifer. Based on ﬁeld survey,
below the coping strategy for three categories of farmers is discussed, i.e. those that sold out, those
that continued farming and those that shifted to selling water for domestic use.
4.1. Farmers who sold out
The sale of land became common after the drying up of tube wells. Small farmers in particular sold
lands to theoutsiders especiallyAfghanRefugees, several ofwhomwere rich through remittances from
theMiddle East or frombusiness in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thiswas a departure from the pastwhen
the custom prevailed to preferably sell land to neighbors and not to outsiders. Farmers – especially
large farmers – that had lands close to themain road changed their holding into commercial shops and
started renting these out onmonthly basis. In addition several ex-farmers joined government services
and small trades.
The price of land increased with the demand for housing from the town. The number of shops in
Kuchlagh for instance increased ten-fold in ﬁfteen years. Agriculture,moreover, became less attractive
due to the proximity of the fast growing town: theft of standing crops and related incidents increased.
In spite of the sell-out, there was no negative affect on the local economy due to decrease of apple
cultivation in the area. Other areas took over Kuchlagh’s earlier premier position in apple cultivation
– able to compete in quality of production as well.
A new trade emerged in 2008 when a modicum of regulation of groundwater came into being.
At this time the issuing of tubewell connections by WAPDA was tightened and was linked to the
groundwater situation in Balochistan. An all-out ban on new agricultural connections was imposed
by the Government throughout the Province. This ban, however, triggered an informal market in
sanctioned tubewell connections that undid the intended effect of the ban.
If a tubewell ran dry the connection could be ofﬁcially transferred to another farmer within the
district or to the area of the concerned electricity grid. The transfer required an ofﬁcial no objection
from the public power company WAPDA. The rates for the transfer were Rs 600,000–700,000 (USD
7–8000). This amount includes cost of reconnection and all related equipments i.e. transformers,
control panel board cables and the submersible pumps. Only with transferred sanctioned connection
farmers can avail the attractive subsidized ﬂat rate that was issued before imposing the ban.
The farmerswho sold out in Kuchlagh did not all quit farming. Many farmers either purchased new
agricultural lands elsewhere (generally at a far cheaper rate than in Kuchlagh) or irrigated lands on
a lease and tenancy basis. Similarly, sizeable numbers of skilled agriculture labor migrated to other
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Table 2
Expenditures and income on agricultural tubewell in Kuchlagh.
No. Item Expenditures (Rs) Income (Rs) Net income (Rs)
1 Electricity 48,000 0 −48,000
2 O & M cost 20,000 0 −20,000
3 Apricot 170,000 250,000 180,000
4 Vegetables 60,000 300,000 240,000
5 Alfalfa 150,00 200,000 185,000
6 Wheat 25,000 150,000 125,000
7 Wheat straw 0 40,000 40,000
Net 702,000
NB: Average farm size per TW is 6–8ha (15–20acres).
areas like nearby Qilla Saifullah or more remote locations – that were close to the Karachi market – in
Lasbela and Uthal Districts.
4.2. Farmers who continued
Drilling of new tube wells for agriculture did not stop but decreased drastically mainly due to
non availability of new connections and the transformation and urbanization of the area. The high
investment of a new tubewell, penetrating into the deep limestone aquifer – at USD 13,000 – with
lesser yields discouraged the development of new wells.
After 1995 ground water further declined to the depth of 120m and more farmers in Kuchlagh
started cutting apple trees due to scarcity of water and competition in market price. Some farmers
tried to sink newdeep borewells to save their drying trees but usually failed to get the desired quantity
of irrigationwater. Thenewborewells in the limestoneaquifermoreoverhadshort life spans– typically
5–7 years before they fell dry, the reason being that theywere exploiting small crevices. Fluctuation in
electricity and long load shedding (16 out of 24h in 2011) further added to the frustration. At this time
the majority of the farmers changed over to low water consuming crops, such as apricot, vegetable
and wheat. Apple orchards were abandoned – either cut down or left to whither.
At this timealso theuseof conveyancepipes becamemore common. Theyhadnot beenusedearlier.
From 1995 onwards farmers made use of galvanized iron pipes to prevent seepage losses from the
diminishingﬂowsand to reach theouter cornersof thecommandarea. In somecases thepipelineswere
also used to overcome level differences. Reinforced concrete pipeswere also used to savewater saving.
Currently, about ﬁfteen tube well owners in Kuchlagh have also provided underground connections
to their personal houses, small hotels and sometimes car washing centers as well.
Table 2 shows the incomes and operation cost of the tube well. With the substitution of the very
lucrative apple cultivation for less rewarding crops proﬁt margins of a tubewell farm are in the order
of Rs 700,000 or USD 8000. If electricity would be charged on market rates instead of subsidized ﬂat
rates this proﬁt margin would be halved. The proﬁt margin may also be compared to the cost of water
in the nearby provincial capital of Quetta. To counter the overuse of groundwater and secure water
supply to the city the construction of a drinking water reservoir is contemplated at a cost of USD 100
Million. The water from the reservoir would take care of 30% of demand in Quetta. The interest on the
investment costs equals USD 6 Million. For this amount one could ‘buy out’ 750 tubewells – which is
three times the number of agricultural tubewells in the Quetta sub-basin that are seen as the major
threat to the sustainable water supply to the city. These could be partly converted to drinking water
resources and the others could be rested.
4.3. Farmers who sell to water tankers
Of the running tubewells a small groupof tubewell owners (5) sellwater for domestic consumption.
In fact these farmers had acquired agricultural connections and pay the subsidized rate to WAPDA,
although they are primarily selling water to urban water trucks. As a minor side activity they also
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Table 3
Expenditures and income on drinking water tubewell in Kuchlagh.
Sr. no. Crops Input/
expenditures (Rs)
Income (Rs) Net income (Rs)
1 Electricity 48,000 0 −48,000
2 O & M cost 30,000 0 −30,000
3 Wheat 25,000 150,000 125,000
4 Water sale (Rs 5600/day) in summer months 0 1,008,800 1,008,000




grow wheat and vegetables on small scale to justify their connection being used for irrigation, yet
their income is primarily fromwater sales. The sales record of one of these ﬁve farmers shows beneﬁts
being more than double of the income that could be generated with farming that would require a far
larger effort (Table 3).
Water is sold to private tractor and truck owners who ﬁll their tankers from the tube well. The
tankers owners pay PAR 80–150 (USD 1–1.8) for the ﬁlling of a 1500L tanker – which is subsequently
delivered to the houses in different areas in Kuchlagh town. Depending on the distance, tanker owners
sell at the rate of PAR 500–700 for home delivery: transport in fact is themajor cost. During electricity
load shedding the cost for pumping go up as generators are used. This additional cost is born by the
tankers owners. The demand bywater tankers varies – in the summermonths it is double of what it is
in thewintermonths as the tankerwater is also used for small home gardens and household livestock.
A tube well owner sells 70–80 tankers per day in the summer month and in winter months it reduces
to 35–40 tankers. The returns for a tubewell owner more than equals the payment for the subsidized
ﬂat rate for the ‘agricultural’ connection in an entire month.
5. Some lessons
At this stage in the semi-arid Province of Balochistan groundwater use exceeds recharge with 22%
– see Table 4 (Halcrow, 2007). In 10 out of 19 sub-basins groundwater use is overused. The Pishin Lora
– of which Kuchlagh is part – accounts for the largest imbalance with consumption a factor 4 higher
than recharge. Almost all use is for agriculture.What happened in Kuchlaghmay be representative for
other areas in Balochistan in the future aswell as for other semi-arid areas dependent on groundwater
for agriculture. The aquifer was depleted.What it meanswas not that groundwater pumpage stopped.
It continued from the hard rock aquifer – and even to some extent on ‘a hand tomouth’ basis from the
alluvial aquifer. The buffer in the alluvial aquifer however was gone – and pumping was less secure
and far less reliable.
There are several lessons to draw from the Kuchlagh aquifer depletion case – in terms of impact
and response and in terms of lessons for the future.
First is that the response to the aquifer collapse inKuchlaghwas verymuch individual and consisted
of adapting to the declining groundwater tables rather than trying to reverse the trend. Adaptation
was ﬁrst done by drilling deeper by those who could afford and accessing water through tenancy
arrangements by those who were losing the ‘race to the bottom’. In the later stage, when the buffer
capacity of the alluvial aquifer was largely exhausted adaptation consisted of searching alternative
livelihoods or in a more limited number of cases pursuing the earlier coping strategy of drilling ever
deeper. The fast urbanization of Kuchlaghprovided the opportunities for: (1) selling out land and start-
ing agri-business elsewhere; and/or (2) ﬁnding non-agricultural employment in the area – including
renting out commercial property.
A second point is that all along there had been little interest in groundwater recharge. The main
intervention had been the publicly funded development of recharge reservoirs, the so-called ‘delay
actions dams’. These delays action dams have been constructed in Balochistan since the 1970s and












Annual water balance for Balochistan and sub-basins in 2007 (billion m3) – Halcrow (2007).
Province Water source Recharge/ﬂow Total use Balance Usages portioned
Agriculture Nature People Livestock
Balochistan
Groundwater (% of total) 2.210 (17) 2.659 (54) −0.459 2.474 (70) n/a (n/a) 0.091 (71) 0.094 (68)
Surface water 10.793 2.221 8.572 1.059 1.079 0.038 0.045
Sub-basins
Dasht River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.100 (13) 0.094 (53) 0.006 0.069 (90) (n/a) 0.013 (81) 0.012 (67)
Surface water 0.66 0.083 0.577 0.008 0.066 0.003 0.006
Gaj River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.070 (23) 0.072 (74) −0.002 0.070 (100) (n/a) 0.001 (100) 0.001 (33)
Surface water 0.233 0.025 0.208 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.002
Gawadar – Ormara
Groundwater (% of total) 0.040 (7) 0.025 (28) 0.015 0.017 (68) (n/a) 0.004 (80) 0.003 (75)
Surface water 0.546 0.064 0.482 0.008 0.055 0.001 0.001
Hamun-e-Lora
Groundwater (% of total) 0.040 (17) 0.141 (83) −0.101 0.139 (95) (n/a) 0.001 (100) 0.001 (50)
Surface water 0.189 0.028 0.161 0.008 0.019 0.000 0.001
Hamun-e-Mashkel
Groundwater (% of total) 0.300 (13) 0.027 (8) 0.273 0.012 (11) (n/a) 0.008 (80) 0.007 (70)
Surface water 2.078 0.312 1.766 0.099 0.208 0.002 0.003
Hingol River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.200 (18) 0.168 (55) 0.032 0.156 (83) (n/a) 0.005 (50) 0.007 (70)
Surface water 0.942 0.136 0.806 0.033 0.094 0.005 0.003
Hub River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.080 (17) 0.088 (52) −0.008 0.086 (68) (n/a) 0.001 (50) 0.001 (50)
Surface water 0.38 0.08 0.300 0.041 0.038 0.001 0.001
Kachi Plain
Groundwater (% of total) 0.180 (9) 0.169 (21) 0.011 0.140 (25) (n/a) 0.017 (61) 0.012 (67)
Surface water 1.902 0.634 1.268 0.428 0.190 0.011 0.006
Kadanai River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.030 (28) 0.115 (92) −0.085 0.110 (100) (n/a) 0.000 (n/a) 0.005 (71)
Surface water 0.077 0.01 0.067 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002
Kaha Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.190 (27) 0.319 (76) −0.129 0.315 (87) (n/a) 0.000 (n/a) 0.004 (67)
Surface water 0.515 0.103 0.412 0.049 0.052 0.000 0.002
Kand River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.010 (36) 0.019 (90) −0.009 0.018 (100) (n/a) 0.000 (n/a) 0.000 (n/a)
Surface water 0.018 0.002 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Kunder River basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.050 (33) 0.048 (64) 0.002 0.048 (75) (n/a) 0.000 (n/a) 0.000 (n/a)
Surface water 0.103 0.027 0.076 0.016 0.010 0.000 0.000
Mula River basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.120 (26) 0.129 (75) −0.009 0.126 (94) (n/a) 0.002 (100) 0.001 (50)
Surface water 0.338 0.043 0.295 0.008 0.034 0.000 0.001
Nari River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.270 (25) 0.180 (59) 0.090 0.171 (81) (n/a) 0.006 (86) 0.004 (67)
Surface water 0.817 0.126 0.691 0.041 0.082 0.001 0.002
Pishin River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.170 (36) 0.566 (77) −0.396 0.513 (82) (n/a) 0.024 (71) 0.029 (67)
Surface water 0.302 0.169 0.133 0.115 0.030 0.010 0.014
Porali River basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.140 (11) 0.146 (38) −0.006 0.142 (54) (n/a) 0.002 (50) 0.003 (75)
Surface water 1.106 0.237 0.869 0.123 0.111 0.002 0.001
Rakhshan River basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.050 (14) 0.081 (70) −0.031 0.075 (100) (n/a) 0.003 (67) 0.003 (75)
Surface water 0.320 0.034 0.286 0.000 0.032 0.001 0.001
Zhob River Basin
Groundwater (% of total) 0.160 (37) 0.270 (71) −0.110 0.267 (77) (n/a) 0.002 (100) 0.001 (50)
Surface water 0.267 0.110 0.157 0.082 0.027 0.000 0.001
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and Sanyy Consultants, 1997). Delay action dams typically have a storage capacity close to 1million
m3 – but the there is wide variation (Halcrow Pakistan and Cameos, 2008b).While the ﬁrst generation
delay action dams in Balochistan was not successful the new generation fared much better – because
of better location and because the impoundedwaterwas recharged through the downstream riverbed
by means of water released out of the storage reservoir. Where they were constructed – downstream
water levels typically went up (with 1.4m).
Based on a study of thirty delay action dams their economic internal rate of returnwas calculated to
be 19% on average (Halcrow Pakistan and Cameos, 2008b). Delay action dams are public investments
and expenditure is relatively high. There was nomatch in the private or community domain and there
was never farmer investment in local recharge although by default the trenches made in Kuchlagh
town for sourcing construction material served to retain some of the surface run-off and recharge
the shallow aquifer. There is in fact a broader repertoire of recharge measures that could have been
applied – catchment protection, sink pits, ﬂood water spreading, cascade dams and spate irrigation
(Van Steenbergen et al., 2011), but these options were not used. There was in fact as good as no
individual or collective investment in recharge – that could have triggered larger concern for and
‘ownership’ of the resource.
User cooperation, in particular participatory groundwater management has been recommended
as a promising strategy for Balochistan – for instance in Techno-consult et al. (2011). Its taking shape
either spontaneous as in parts of Yemen or guided and supported as in parts of South India. It has
not spread in Balochistan beyond a limited few examples (Van Steenbergen, 1995). There are sev-
eral possible explanations why no spontaneously self-regulation happened in Kuchlagh. One is that
the number of wells in the Kuchlagh area is too large for a spontaneous process. The examples from
Yemen show that were local management took off spontaneously the number of wells were in the
tens or less (Taher et al., 2012). This reduces the number of players and agreement can be reached
without external facilitation. The second reason for the lack of action in Kuchlagh is that the well
owners after the inﬂux of the Afghan refugees were not closely knit but diverse. Coupled with the
absence of dominating leadership in the Pashtun ethnic group it was difﬁcult to see who would
assume a leadership role in addressing the issue. Cooperation did not come off the ground, because
no one – internally or externally – ever took the initiative in the area. In Kuchlagh even studies that
were undertaken to chart the groundwater resource were never shared with the community of users
themselves.
On a different level the course of events in Kuchlagh is strongly reminiscent of the ‘desakota’
phenomena, where in an urbanizing context rural-urban relations are redeﬁned on several fronts:
economically, ecologically and institutionally (Desakota Study Team, 2008). In case of the Kuch-
lagh ‘desakota’ the increased connections to outside markets triggered the unprecedented use of
groundwater, resulting in its eclipse in a period of 15–20 years. The inﬂux of outsiders weakened
traditional social relations and made a community response less likely. On the other hand the grow-
ing urban economy provided alternative livelihood opportunities and made it possible to cushion
the blow of natural resource depletion. Land was converted into shop fronts and some well-owners
turned toward selling water to urban consumers. The growing city provided job opportunities and
skilled farm labor moved out and found employment in commercial horticulture in other parts of
the Province. All in all the impact of the aquifer collapse on the livelihood of people was not overly
dramatic. The decline was gradual and largely unseen (as no one ever discussed the groundwater
situation). People adapted to the new reality and the diminishing opportunities related to ground-
water use did not result in conﬂicts or in cooperation. Even the rules on regulating groundwater use
through electricity connections were circumvented and there was no protest or commotion whatso-
ever.
Though the possible shock of disappearing groundwater resource base was largely absorbed by
new income opportunities in and around Kuchlagh Town what is lost the capacity of the agricultural
sector to provide secure jobs.What is gone also is the capacity to tidy over a dry spell in Kuchlaghwith
local groundwater resources. This has left the area – including the town – more exposed to variability
and climate change. In addition as the groundwater reservoir was depleted the option of high value
and low cost horticulture disappeared in spite of a nearbymarket to be substituted by a less rewarding
farm production system.
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6. Conclusion: conﬂict, cooperation or socio-institutional void
In contrast to what Neo-Malthusian or Boserup-inspired theories predict, at no stage did conﬂict
arise or was co-operation triggered. No local rules on groundwater allocation were initiated, nor did
anybody take steps to reduce on water consumption, by using efﬁcient ﬁeld irrigation or phasing
out crops with a high water footprint or low returns per water consumed. Zeitoun and Mirumachi
(2010) describe that conﬂicts and cooperation may co-exist at the same time and that cooperation
may be repressive whereas conﬂicts may be liberating in that they may break an impasse. However
in Kuchlagh also this more diverse pattern did not emerge.
There were several factors explaining this collective ‘sitting duck’ attitude. First, understanding of
the imminent disaster was for a long time hidden as farmers were least aware of the nature of the
aquifer system4 and were under the impression that the deepening of wells could continue forever –
and so therewas no urgency to act. Second, the group of tubewell ownerswas large and because of the
inﬂux of Afghan immigrants no longer homogenous. Several farmers expected the local leader of the
area to take the initiative but nothing happened. Local rules or restrictions on individual groundwater
use – would these have been formulated – in principle could get a formal legal cover. The Balochis-
tan Groundwater Rights Ordinance ﬁrst announced in 1978 and then amended in 2001, in principle
would provide the basis for such local groundwater management. The objective of the Groundwater
Rights Administration Ordinance was “to regulate the use of groundwater and to administer the rights
of the various persons therein”. Under the Ordinance existing groundwater extraction points were to
be registered and location-speciﬁc rules to be developed and agreed by the main local stakeholders.
Against such local rules the district civil administration would then issue permits for the develop-
ment of new karezes, dugwells and tubewells. The relevant authority would be the District Water
Committee, composed of government ofﬁcials as well as two appointed local ‘notables’. As such, the
Balochistan Ordinance was one of the ﬁrst ‘enabling’ groundwater laws, but unfortunately it was not
put in effect as such. With a few exceptions no one made the effort to come to the formulation of
such local rules (Van Steenbergen, 1995). In Kuchlagh no one took the initiative – least of all the local
traditional leadership. The Government of Balochistan similarly did not intervene. In the end rather
than earlier envisaged location-speciﬁc locally agreed rules, a standard minimum distance rule was
adopted in an amendment of the Ordinance, which also carried little meaning.
Nordid conﬂicts arise at any stage, in fact thegradual depletionwasa collectiveproblem, something
all well owners faced – without this being attributed to the pumping behavior of any individual or
group of individuals. There was an undividedness in the resource use.When somewells in fact fell dry
they were connected by pipelines to the remaining wells that were still operational. The closest the
Kuchlagh farmers came to cooperation and the cooperation was to share the burden, not to address
the overuse.
So there was no conﬂict and no cooperation – just adaptation to a new reality facilitated by the
urbanization taking place. In fact one could argue it might have been better if there had been conﬂict:
it could have triggered some collective action and effort to better manage the limited groundwa-
ter resource and use it more productively and strategically. Conﬂict is often seen as the opposite of
cooperation: more conﬂict means less cooperation and vice versa. Conﬂict is associated with resource
destruction, but it could be the opposite – itmaywell be the opening toward preservation of a resource
under stress.
Focusing on conﬂict and cooperation one may overlook the situations where neither conﬂict nor
cooperation occurs. These maybe called ‘socio-institutional voids’. Even though pressure mounts on a
resource, no action is triggered. Forests may be depleted, rivers polluted, ﬁsh stocks depleted, erosion
increased – but nothing happens: no conﬂict between the users but also no corrective action or coop-
eration that turns the depletion around. In case of groundwater ‘the race to the bottom’ runs to the
very end and no stage any one intervenes. We would like argue that it is useful to better understand
and address such socio-institutional voids than studying conﬂicts or cooperation that have already
4 Groundwater studies had been done for instance by WAPDA Hydrogeology yet these were never shared let alone commu-
nicated.
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occurred. It suggests also a different handling perspective: not tomitigate conﬂicts, but to address the




The comments of two anonymous reviewers is gratefully acknowledges, as is the support of Marta
Agujetas in ﬁnalizing this document. This longitudinal study was undertaken as part of the NWO-
supported CoCoon research project ‘Groundwater in the Political Domain’.
References
Baloch, M.A., Tanik, A., 2008. Development of an integrated watershed management strategy for resource conservation in
Balochistan Province of Pakistan. Desalination 226 (1–3), 38–46.
Desakota Study Team, 2008. Re-imagining the Rural–Urban Continuum: Understanding the role Ecosystem Services Play in the
Livelihoods of the Poor in Diskette Regions Undergoing Rapid Change. ISET, Nepal.
Giordano, M., 2009. Global groundwater? Issues and solutions. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 34, 153–178.
Halcrow, 2007. Supporting Public ResourceManagement in Balochistan. Basin-wideWater ResourcesAvailability andUse. Asian
Development Bank: Supporting Public Resource Management in Balochistan.
HalcrowPakistanandCameos, 2008a. PishinLoraBasinManagementPlan.AsianDevelopmentBank: SupportingPublicResource
Management in Balochistan.
Halcrow Pakistan and Cameos, 2008b. Effectiveness of the Delay Action/storage Dams in Balochistan. Quetta: Supporting Public
Resource Management in Balochistan.
Khair, S.M., Culas, R.J., Hafeez,M., 2010. The causes of groundwater decline in upland Balochistan region of Pakistan: implication
for water management policies. In: Paper presented at the 39th Australian Conference of Economists (ACE 2010), Sydney,
Australia 27–29 September 2010.
Kulkarni, H., Shah, M., Shankar, V., 2015. Shaping the contours of groundwater governance in India. J. Hydrol.: Reg. Stud. 4,
172–192.
Mukherjee, A., Saha, D., Harvey, C.F., Taylor, R.G., Ahmed, K.M., 2015. Groundwater systems of the Indian sub-continent. J.
Hydrol.: Reg. Stud. 4, 1–14.
Mustafa, D., UsmanQazi, M., 2007. Transition fromKarez to tubewell irrigation: development, modernization, and social capital
in Balochistan, Pakistan. World Dev. 35, 1796–1813.
Nippon Giken Inc, Sanyy Consultants, 1997. Feasibility Study on the Irrigation Water Resources Development with Delay
Action Dams Project in Balochistan in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Irrigation and Power Department, Government
of Balochistan/Japan International Cooperation Agency.
National Academy of Sciences, 2012. Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security. The National
Academies Press, Washington, DC.
Taher, T., Bruns, B., Bamaga, O., Al-Weshali, A., van Steenbergen, F., 2012. Local groundwater governance in
Yemen: building on traditions and enabling communities to craft new rules. Hydrogeol. J. 20 (6), 1177–1188,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10040-012-0863-1.
Techno-consult, ACE, Cameos, 2011. Groundwater Management Action Plan for Pishin Lora Basin and Implementation of Pilot
Program in Quetta Sub-basin. Quetta: Balochistan Small Scale Irrigation Project.
Van Steenbergen, Frank, 1995. The frontier problem in incipient groundwater management regimes in Balochistan (Pakistan).
Hum. Ecol. 23, 1.
Van Steenbergen, F., 1996. Land, water and ethnicity: social organization and resource management in irrigated communities
in Balochistan. In: Titus, P. (Ed.), Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-colonial Balochistan. Oxford
University Press, Karachi.
Van Steenbergen, F., Tuinhof, A., Knoop, L., 2011. Transforming Landscapes, Transforming Lives: The Business of Sustainable
Water Buffer Management. IFAD, Rome.
UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme, 2003. Water for People, Water for Life. A Joint Report by the Twenty-three UN
Agencies Concerned with Freshwater. UNESCO, Paris, pp. 576.
Wada, Y., van Beek, L.P.H., van Kempen, C.M., Reckman, J.W.T.M., Vasak, S., Bierkens, M.F.P., 2010. Global depletion of ground-
water resources. Geophys. Res. Lett. 37, 1–5.
Zeitoun, M., Mirumachi, N., 2010. Transboundary water interaction: reconsidering conﬂict and cooperation. In: Wegerich, K,
Warner, J (Eds.), The Politics of Water: A Survey. Routledge, London.
